Particles vs. Structures: Weak Ontic Structuralism by Kantorovich, Aharon
Particles vs. structures: Weak ontic structuralism
Aharon Kantorovich
                                
Abstract 
In modern physics the notion of structure can be treated as an extension of the notion of law of nature. French and Ladyman’s view concerning the ontological priority of structures over objects is confronted with Psillos’ criticism. This kind of view agrees with the paradigmatic case where the structure is an internal symmetry and the instantiations are elementary particles. An ontological model is proposed which demonstrates the relation between structures and their instantiations in this case. This view which may be categorized as “weak ontic structuralism” is compared with Busch’s treatment of ontic structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics. 

1. The scope of structural continuity 
The renewed interest in ontological structuralism in the philosophy of science was motivated by the re-appearance of Poincare’s structural realism through Worrall's work (1989). By his version of structural realism, Worrall intends to resolve the conflict between two major arguments concerning scientific realism, the “no-miracles argument” and “pessimistic meta-induction”. The no-miracles argument may be summarized as follows: if the unobservable entities postulated by successful scientific theories did not exist or if the theories were not true, then the high predictive power and explanatory success of modern science would be treated as a miracle or cosmic coincidence. If we believe that scientific progress is not miraculous, we may accept scientific realism since it provides us with the best explanation for the success of science. In contrast with the no-miracles argument, the pessimistic meta-induction argument seems to undermine scientific realism (see for example Laudan 1984, Psillos 1999)). According to the latter argument, we cannot commit ourselves to the belief in present theories since successful theories throughout the history of science were refuted or abandoned. From this we conclude that present successful theories are likely to be replaced or refuted too. This is a kind of second-order induction, since the inductive inference operates here on laws or theories that in their turn are products of first-order induction performed on natural phenomena. Of course, only naïve inductivists would accept this claim unquestionably, but practically, in many cases this kind of logically unjustified induction is a reliable guide for us in ordinary and scientific experience. 
Worrall attempts to overcome the above conflict by claiming that in the transition from the old to the new theory there is continuity in mathematical structure, whereas the physical content changes. He refers in particular to physics and refers to the case of the transition from Fresnel's theory of light to Maxwell's theory of the electromagnetic field. He also mentions the cases in the early 20th century where the “correspondence principle” applied (e.g. the transition from classical to quantum mechanics). The latter cases demonstrate only partial continuity of structure. 
However, we cannot generalize from these cases to the sweeping thesis that in “mature” science the mathematical structure does not change in the transition from one theory to its successor. A major counterexample to the thesis appears in the forefront of modern physics. In the transition from the Eightfold Way (EW) to the Standard Model (SM) in particle physics we find the same underlying mathematical group – SU(3) – as one of the symmetries operating in the field. However, in SM the same mathematical group operates on entirely different physical magnitudes – on “colors” instead of the old “flavors” – not to mention other substantial changes (e.g. the new gauge symmetry is local, whereas the old symmetry was global). The EW was by no means unsuccessful. It yielded at least two major achievements. First, the prediction of the omega-minus particle which is considered to be an exemplary achievement in modern physics; it can be compared with the prediction of new chemical elements by the Periodic Table or the prediction of the positron by Dirac. Secondly, the EW led directly to the discovery/construction of the quarks and, eventually to SM. So the EW (as well as the very successful SM) was part of a mature science, and cannot be equated in this respect to phlogiston theory which was part of an immature science. But in the transition to the new theory –SM – there was no continuity of structure. Although the same mathematical group reappears in the SM as one of the underlying symmetries.  
Since EW was a successful theory, it would be a miracle if it did not reflect – at least approximately – some aspects of reality. But contrary to Worrall’s conception, in the EW-SM transition the underlying structure did not remain the same. Today, in retrospect, there are physicists who claim that this approximate symmetry was merely "phenomenological", or even "accidental". For instance, Steven Weinberg (1997, p. 40) claims that "these symmetries never were anything but accidents". A transition which would exhibit structural continuity could take place if the original SU(3) would be replaced by SU(6) which is an extension of the original SU(3). Indeed, the latter structure was generated by the triplet of up, down and strange quarks, {u, d, s}, which form the fundamental representation of SU(3). If we add the other triplet of charm, bottom and top quarks, {c, b, t}, which appear in the SM table of quarks, we get all six quarks which may be assigned to the six-dimensional, fundamental representation of the group SU(6).​[1]​ The transition from SU(3) to SU(6) would be simpler from the group-theoretical perspective. However, it would exclude leptons from the picture and would not account, for instance, for electroweak unification. This hypothetical transition would exhibit structural continuity at the expense of significantly reduced unification of the forces.
Thus, in trying to overcome pessimistic meta-induction with respect to scientific theories, Worrall employs too “optimistic” induction with respect to structures. But an overall optimism is not justified here. Instead, cases of theoretical change may be positioned anywhere along the spectrum of continuity/discontinuity with respect to structures. The cases of partial continuity, such as in the big changes in early 20th century physics, deserve a special attention since they signify real progress, where the old theories can be treated as limiting cases of the new ones (with c, h0). But it is not clear what kind of “structure” was kept invariant in these cases. To treat some mathematical results as approximately true does not justify the new title of “structural continuity”; this subject have been discussed extensively in physics and in the philosophy of science under titles such as “correspondence principle”. Nevertheless, although the scope and validity of structural continuity are limited, the notion of structure that emerges from this debate and – more importantly – from the developments in the second half of 20th century theoretical physics leads to new insights into this notion, independently of the question of structural continuity.






2. Explicating structure 
In the physico-chemical sciences the notion of structure is frequently used to refer to the deep ontological level below the phenomenological​[2]​ or empirical surface. This notion is more general than the structural realist’s mathematically-oriented notion (e.g. Worrall’s) which refers to an abstract kind of structure, such as electromagnetism. The general notion subsumes also a concrete kind of structure. The latter can be characterized as a system of entities and properties possibly hidden from our senses – as in the cases of the molecular structure of gases, the structure of hydrogen atom, or the quark composition of hadrons. This notion complies with the traditional mechanistic-corpuscularian-atomistic narrative or with the ontology of objects and properties. The narrative tells us about physical entities, such as particles in motion or propagating waves in matter. Concrete structure yields a set of relations (laws), such as in the case of the kinetic theory of gases or Bohr’s model of the hydrogen atom, which generates the laws connecting the pressure, volume and absolute temperature of ideal gas (Boyle’s law etc.), or the regularities of hydrogen line spectra (Balmer’s series etc.), respectively. 
An abstract structure consists of a web of relations, such as Maxwell’s equations. According to Stathis Psillos (2001. p. 14), only the structure of the world can be known, where the structure is defined as “the totality of formal, logico-mathematical properties” of the world. He is talking here about an abstract structure and in order to distinguish between a mathematical and a physical structure, we must add to the latter a physical interpretation. However, this definition is too broad; it refers to any collection of interpreted mathematical entities – quantities, functions, equations etc. However, as it is generally conceived, the structure of a certain domain in the world should cover and control all the phenomena in that domain. It cannot be just a collection of unrelated or loosely-related relations or regularities that are expressed by mathematical formulas, such as the empirical gas “laws” (the meaning of the quotation marks will be shortly explained) before the kinetic theory or the empirical “laws” of electricity and magnetism before Maxwell’s theory. We would not call such an accidental collection of relations or regularities expressed mathematically a structure or a structure of something. I suggest that, ideally, the structure underlying a given area should cover the whole area and introduce the following four partially overlapping requirements into its system of regularities: (1) compactness, (2) interconnectedness, (3) completeness and (4) unification. The first requirement means that the structure is simple and includes minimal number of natural kinds. The second means that each regularity is connected directly or indirectly to all other regularities so that no regularity remains isolated. The third means that the web of regularities covers all the phenomena in the field. And the fourth means that in the epistemic process of structuralization, seemingly disparate phenomena become unified. These four requirements assure us that the structure forms a non-fragmented picture of a given domain of reality. Indeed, to some extent, these requirements were satisfied by the above-mentioned ideal gas model or the theory of electromagnetism. This seems to be a reasonable (partial) explication of what is meant by “structure” in the present context. 
A structure provides a simple and strong explanation to the variety of phenomena in the field in terms of a minimal number of postulated physical entities. Indeed, explanatory simplicity is achieved if requirement (1) is fulfilled. Requirement (2) is satisfied since a common physical structure stands behind the regularities and provides a connection between them. Requirement (3) is met if indeed the structural theory covers all the phenomena in the field. Finally, if all kinds of previously unrelated phenomena in different fields are explained and unified by a common structure, the fourth requirement is fulfilled.
Thus, in classical physics the presence of a concrete structure behind the level of phenomena leads to the fulfillment of the above four requirements. In modern physics classical corpuscular entities are replaced by quantum-mechanical or field-theoretical particles. However, as will be demonstrated below, abstract structures such as internal symmetries and the corresponding invariants and conserved quantities play a major role in the field, whereas particles play only a secondary role. The structure in this case is an interpreted mathematical system which yields a network of relations satisfying the above-mentioned four requirements. Thus both kinds of structures – concrete and abstract – yield this set of requirements. 
According to epistemic structuralism (as expressed by Psillos), only the structural aspects of the world can be known. This accords with the familiar view that (physical) science can deal only with those aspects of reality that are amenable to quantitative or mathematical treatment. A strong version of ontic structuralism maintains that there is no extra-structural reality. A weaker version says that structures are ontologically prior to objects or entities in a sense that will be explained below (see for example Busch 2003, Kantorovich 2003). In view of modern physics, the latter view seems to be more realistic since particles exist in the quantum world. Quantum particles obey quantum statistics, but in bubble-chamber photographs (for instance) we can see very vividly single particle tracks.

3. From regularities to laws and from laws to structures 
In view of the great theories of 20th century physics, laws have gained new significance from the structures within which they were embedded or in the light of which they were revised. The notion of abstract structure can be viewed as an extension of the notion of law in the following manner. A law can be treated as a regularity which is backed by, or can be derived from, a comprehensive structure which backs all other regularities in the field. This conception explicates a common practice of the physicists. But it is also compatible with the metaphysical view that nature is not fragmented, whether or not physicists hold this belief. For instance, only after the kinetic theory has been established, Boyle’s empirical law of ideal gas could be treated as a law of nature since it was backed by an established (concrete) structure which covered other regularities in the field as well. Every such regularity contributed to the degree of confirmation of the theory, and the latter, in its turn, conferred high confirmation upon the regularities. This kind of mutual confirmation was an indication that these regularities might represent laws. 
Since the prolonged attempts to find metaphysical and logical criteria for identifying laws of nature have encountered intractable problems (for a review of these problems, see, for example  van Fraassen’s 1989), the above explication of the physicists’ interpretation might provide us with alternative criteria.  In this connection, John Earman distinguishes between laws of nature and laws of science, or in particular laws of physics. Earman claims that “what physicists mean by the laws of physics is, roughly, a set of true principles that form a strong but simple and unified system that can be used to predict and explain” (Earman 2002, p.3). This claim is very close to our view about the four requirements of a structured system of laws. Indeed, interconnectedness, completeness, compactness and unification imply strength and simplicity of the system. Thus, the laws of science are not metaphysical entities; rather they serve as scientific tools for explanation and prediction. Laws of nature, on the other hand, are supposed to have metaphysical attributes. The following are examples of such attributes: laws of nature are regularities or relations which are objective, express nomological necessity, express truth about natural kinds or are invariable relations among universals. 
To use Earman’s nomenclature, the notion of abstract structure may be viewed as an extension of the notion of physical law in the following manner. The idea is that an empirical regularity can be treated as a law of physics only if it is integrated within a compact network of interrelated regularities that cover a wide domain of phenomena (see also Kosso 2000). According to this conception, a law of physics is a regularity which is linked with a set of many interrelated regularities in a given domain. The set satisfies the four requirements which characterize a structure. The regularities covered in this way by the structure would not be considered by the realist to be “accidental” anymore – they would be treated as laws of nature and the integrated network of laws may be treated as a “super-law”. It should be made clear that this view about the laws of physics is supposed to explicate the physicists’ attitude towards laws​[3]​, but it is not a statement about the logical or metaphysical nature of laws. 
The advent of Maxwell’s electromagnetism and the removal of the ether as the bearer of electromagnetic waves signified a major step in the transition to abstract structures. The interpreted mathematical component referring to the structure became the major player in the field. The instrumentalist would be content with this since the mathematical machinery leads directly to calculations and predictions of measurable results and there is no need for a covering story. But the committed realist would look for something more – for the “building blocks” of reality, so to speak. This time, however, the building blocks are intangible. The realist might look for these building blocks in the metaphysics of Platonic realism (see, for example, Michael Tooley 1977 and James Brown 1994). The Platonic narrative tells us that laws of nature are invariable relations among universals. Laws are not parasitic on objects, properties or events. Laws do not have to be instantiated in order to exist.
 In order to comprehend the Platonic view we may employ the treatment of laws, developed independently by David Armstrong (1983), Fred Dretske (1977) and Tooley. “Each claims that laws of nature are relations among universals, i.e. among abstract entities which exist independently of physical objects, independently of us and outside of space and time” (Brown, p. 96). Tooley’s view is the most Platonic among the three. Armstrong maintains that when we have a law which states that all Fs are Gs, it means that there is a relation of necessitation between the universals F-ness and G-ness. He symbolizes the relation of nomic necessitation between the universals F and G as N(F,G).  This relation can be viewed as a theoretical entity which explains why the universal regularity about particulars (x)(Fx  Gx) holds. In order not to leave this as an ad hoc explanation, we may hypothesize the existence of a structure that endows upon the regularity the status of nomic necessitation. In fact, if we wish to keep a distance from too heavy metaphysics and dispense with the notion of nomic necessitation, we might replace this notion by the notion of structure which backs the regularity and thus converts it into a law by integrating it with a large network of laws. According to the Platonic view the relations among universals can be treated independently of particulars and webs of these relations, such as the structures, can be treated similarly.
The network of regularities is unified through the abovementioned fourth attribute that the structure introduces into the otherwise accidental tangle of mathematically-expressed regularities. In the world of quantum fields we have the following pattern of unification which is based on an underlying internal symmetry. In QED, the photon field is the mediator of the electromagnetic force, and the underlying symmetry group, U(1), unifies and controls the dynamics. In the case of the electroweak fields the unification is provided by the larger symmetry U(1) X SU(2) which dictates the number and properties of the fields which mediate the forces, i.e. the photon and the triplet of Z bosons, that are viewed as four different components of one field – the electroweak field. In the case of grand unification the dynamics is dictated by still larger symmetry group, such as SU(5)​[4]​ with the corresponding 24 mediators – the 12 electroweak and strong gauge bosons (gluons) plus the 12 X-bosons. Again, all 24 fields can be seen as different components of one field. In all these cases the symmetry dictates the existence and properties of the mediator fields and therefore determines the dynamics. Thus all gauge symmetries from U(1) to SU(5) (for instance) exhibit the same pattern: the symmetry is a central component of the structure and the gauge fields are the central dynamical variables in the structure (see Kantorovich 2003 for further details). From now on I’ll concentrate on this paradigmatic case.
 
4. Ontic structuralism: the case of internal symmetries
A view which can be categorized as ontic structuralism is advocated for instance by Steven French and James Ladyman (F&L). Ladyman maintains that structures are “primitive and ontologically subsistent” (Ladyman 1998, p. 420). This means that structures are independent of an ontology of individuals and properties. Furthermore, individuals can be viewed as “different representations of the same structure” (ibid). This statement can be understood most clearly when the structure is a symmetry group. Indeed, F&L’s paradigm case for structure is the symmetry group. Their position would become much sharper if we apply it specifically to internal symmetries in particle physics, which have a distinctive ontological status.
Let us consider the relation between internal symmetries and particles, viewed as structures and their instantiations, respectively, in the case of EW, when field theory was ignored. For the sake of demonstration let us employ the simple examples of isospin-SU(2) and unitary-spin-SU(3)​[5]​ before SM. According to these symmetries, a family of particles, such as the pair of nucleons or the eight lower baryons (the nucleons, sigmas, cascades and lambda), was treated as a set of different members of a group-theoretical representation of the symmetry group – such as an iso-doublet and an SU(3)-octet, respectively. According to this picture, different observers may perceive reality differently, depending on their frame of reference. For instance, when one observer sees a proton in his/her frame of reference, another observer, whose frame of reference is rotated from the first in isospin space, may see a neutron​[6]​. Now, since objective reality should be independent of the reference frame, objective status can be given only to the invariants of the group. For instance, under isospin transformations the particle states (e.g. proton or neutron) are not invariant, whereas total isospin, measured by the operator I2 = Ix2 + Iy2 + Iz2, remains invariant. The operator of total isospin is an example of a Casimir operator. The Casimir operators commute with all the generators of the group and its eigenvalues are therefore invariant under all the transformations of the group (which are spun by these generators). In general, the eigenvalues of the Casimir operators are the invariant quantum numbers associated with the symmetry group and as such they characterize each representation of the group​[7]​. The commutation relations between the generators Gi of a Lie group are: [Gi,Gj] = icijkGk, where cijk are called – not unexpectedly – the “structure constants” of the group. This is true for the case of exact symmetry. When symmetry-breaking terms are added to the commutation relations the structure becomes more intricate.
When French employs group theory for demonstrating the claim that structures require no individuals in order to exist, he poses the following question: “how can we talk of a group if we have done away with the elements which are grouped?” His answer is that “the elements themselves, regarded as individuals, have only a heuristic role in allowing for the introduction of the structures which then carry the ontological weight” (French 1999, p. 204). This claim can be interpreted as reflecting the attitude of some leading theoreticians in the mid-1960s who focused their interest on the symmetry, whereas the hadrons were treated mainly as means of discovering and testing the symmetry. The reason for that attitude was the explosion in the hadron population at the time – from the two nucleons and three pions to tens of new short-living hadron resonance. As a consequence, the discovery of new hadrons at higher and higher energies has become almost a routine. A more significant task was to find the deep structure behind this flood of the short-living hadrons. As a result, these particles were not treated as “elementary” any more. Indeed, the word “elementary” was dropped from the title “elementary particle physics”. The relation between particles and the structure, i.e. between hadrons and the EW, may be compared with the relation between the spectral lines of hydrogen and Bohr’s planetary model of the atom. The ontological priority of the structure is evident here. The physicist was interested in the details of hydrogen’s spectra as means of uncovering hydrogen’s structure.  Alternatively, French's view may reflect Gell-Mann’s treatment of quarks as mathematical building blocks of his current algebra which could be dispensed with after the current algebra was constructed. 
In a reply to French's claim, Psillos argues that this is a wrong ontological thesis, presumably because structural relations are obtained by “pairing off individuals and mapping properties and relations onto one another” (2001 p. 14). But, as we can see from Gell-Mann’s example, this is not the only way the symmetry group or the current algebra can be interpreted. Gell-Mann’s quarks where not individuals; they where mathematical elements from which the structure was constructed. Thus, in particle physics we have witnessed a shift of interest from particles to structures (symmetry groups or current algebras). Particles act as our information channels to the symmetry, and as such they are indeed devoid of “ontological weight”; particles play mainly an epistemic role. 
 One of the best ways to demonstrate this relation between structures and their instantiations is to examine the classification of elementary particles in representations of internal symmetry groups. In the early and mid 1960s, when field theory was almost ignored in particle physics, theoretical particle physicists were divided into camps: those who dealt with the dynamics and those who were engaged with symmetries. The latter saw the main object of their study the algebraic relations (i.e. the commutation relations) between the quantum-mechanical operators that measure the various (generalized) charges (e.g. electric charge, isospin or hypercharge). As was indicated above, the group-structure could be defined through the commutation relations between the generators of the group, without mentioning particle states. The representations of the group, which were determined by the group, accommodated the particles, but the structure exists independently of the existence of the particles, i.e. independently of the instantiations of the structure. 
In other words, if we adopt the Platonic view of structures, we can say that the structural relations exist independently of the instantiations. According to this view, laws are invariable relations among universals. Instantiation is not a necessary condition for the existence of laws. For instance, a law stating that all entities of kind R (e.g. ravens) have the property B (e.g. black) exists even in a world where no entity of the kind R exists, i.e. in a world where the universal R is not instantiated. A law is just a relation among universals (e.g. between “ravenhood” and “blackhood”). As was indicated above, the notion of structure, which is an extension of this concept of law, can be treated in a Platonic manner as a web of laws. According to this metaphysical conception, structures indeed carry the ontological weight. 
Psillos also claims that it is a wrong epistemological thesis that structures can be known independently of the individuals which instantiate them. This claim is justified in our case of internal symmetries, since the only experimental access we have to these symmetries is through the particles. It should be noted that the word “know” is used here in a narrow empiricist sense: i.e. we know something only when we observe it through established experimental procedures. Yet, knowledge of the structure in a wider sense can be attained by constructing a theory about the structure and confirming it strongly. But again, the confirmation of the theory can be achieved only by experimenting with particles. 
In general, according to Platonic structuralism, structures (such as internal symmetries) exist independently of their instantiations (e.g. particle phenomena), but the only solid information channel to the structures is attained through these instantiations. So we can imagine a physically possible world where a structure (such as unitary symmetry) is not instantiated (e.g. a world empty of hadrons) and without sufficient energy to produce these instantiations. 

5. The filter model for structures: Weak ontic structuralism
The Platonic realist relation between structures and their instantiations can be illustrated in a metaphorical way in the case when the structure is the internal symmetry and the instantiations are particles. Let us imagine a vertical cylindrical mold filled with some amorphous plastic stuff, such as plasticine or dough, which is compressed from the top by a piston. Inside the cylinder, near the bottom, there is an invisible filter (hidden within the opaque cylinder) consisting of holes of different shapes and sizes. Pieces of this stuff (“particles”) emerge outside the cylinder through the filter. The filter in this model has more fundamental significance than the particles since it determines the shapes and sizes of the emerging particles; the geometrical properties of each particle determine its identity. Furthermore, the particles would not be produced at all without the act of compression. The filter, on the other hand, exists independently of this act. 
Thus, the parallelism between this model and the above relation between the structure and the particles consists of the following elements. The filter corresponds to the structure or the internal symmetry behind the particle phenomena. Again, for the sake of simplicity let us consider the exemplary case of the unitary symmetry or the EW as the symmetry of hadrons. In this case the structure encompassed the collection of all (ordinary and generalized) conservation laws of the various physical magnitudes of hadrons, such as electric charge, hypercharge, total isospin and the two magnitudes measured by the two Casimir operators of SU(3). The human observer, equipped with the appropriate experimental tools, can detect only the particles. The act of compressing the piston corresponds to an investment of energy in the process, whether in the lab or in natural processes (e.g. in the stars). The most conspicuous example of such a process is particle-antiparticle pair production in a photon-photon interaction, where hadron pairs are generated subject to the restrictions and control of the symmetry. In a pair production, such as the production of proton-antiproton pair, a minimal energy of the incoming photons is required. Thus, energy is what drives the piston in our metaphor. And what is the plasticine or the amorphous matter? It seems that the plasticine corresponds to the vacuum which is the state with the lowest energy of the world, or the world with all excitations removed.  
The structure – represented by the filter – is hidden from our eyes. We have an epistemic access (through sophisticated experimental devices) only to the shadows-world – the world of particles – whereas the symmetries are the Platonic puppets which hide from our eyes. We are imprisoned in our cave (the world outside the cylinder), observe the shadows (the particles) and make use of our imagination and reason to construct theories about the underlying structure. Our hypothetical hadron-free world is a world without sufficient energy to produce hadrons. This corresponds to the case where the act of compressing the piston is not strong enough, so that no piece of stuff emerges through the filter. 
The filter model cannot represent ontic structuralism, since it does not imply that there is nothing else in the world beyond structures; it accommodates particles as instantiations of the structure. However, it demonstrates the following weaker thesis: there is a physically possible world where the structure exists (in a Platonic sense) but its instantiations do not. In this possible world the physical contingencies are such that no instantiation exists, but the structure exists independently of contingencies. Therefore, we can say that the structure is “ontologically prior” (see Kantorovich 2003) to its instantiations. The latter have lower ontological status; they are eliminated only in some possible worlds, whereas structures exist in all possible worlds. This view may be called “weak ontic structuralism”. Internal symmetries, such as EW, can be treated as a paradigmatic case for this relation between structure and their instantiations. It should be stressed that this is not a strict argument for weak ontic structuralism. It is only suggested that this view is consistent with the picture of internal symmetries which prevailed in particle physics in the 1960s.

6. Structures vs objects
A similar view is expressed by Jacob Busch. He identifies a strong version of ontic structuralism as the view “that structures have ontological primacy over objects” and this “either means [1] that structures are all that exist or [2] that entities are dependent for their own existence on the existence of structures” (Busch 2003, p. 211). The disjunct 1 is identical with ontic structuralism, whereas 2 is equivalent to weak ontic structuralism represented by our filter model. His “weak”​[8]​ version of ontic structuralism is the view that “structures exist alongside objects in an independent fashion”. But this version does not account for objects as instantiations of structures, since the existence of the instantiations here does depend on the structures.  Our weak ontic structuralism implies the possible or contingent existence of extra-structural entities – particles and properties. Thus, we would interpret Busch’s expression that B is “dependent” for its existence on the existence of A by saying that A is ontologically prior to B. Ontological priority is defined as follows: If there is a physically possible world where A exists but B does not, but not vice versa, then A is ontologically prior to B. 
Further light is shed upon the relation between structures and individuals by Busch’s comparison between structuralism in natural science and a structuralist position developed in the philosophy of mathematics by Stewart Shapiro (1997). He refers to Shapiro’s view “that mathematical structures exist prior to, and independent of, any exemplification they may have in the non-mathematical world” (Busch 2003, p. 213). This accords with our Platonic structuralism or weak ontic structuralism, where “exemplifications” in the non-mathematical world can be treated on a par with “instantiations”. Busch expresses the Platonic conception as follows: “if there is nothing in this world that can occupy the role of relata, the relation still exist”. This is the counterpart of our hadron-free world, a possible world where the symmetry or the algebra of currents exists but the hadrons do not. However, Busch joins Psillos in rejecting the elimination of individuals implied by this view, claiming that “[i]t is plausible to believe that ontology terminates somewhere”, i.e. “that somewhere there are individuals”. Indeed, it is true that a structure may be “made of” substructures, but the chain of substructures does not necessarily terminate in individuals. For instance, current algebra was made of quantum-mechanical operators which are not “individuals” or physical objects; rather they are components of the structure. The operators measure physical magnitudes of particles which may exist or not – depending on what possible world we are talking about – whereas the current algebra or the internal symmetry group does exist in every possible world, including a world empty of individuals. Hence according to weak ontic structuralism the existence of individuals is optional, whereas according to Busch’s belief it is obligatory.
Until now weak ontic structuralism have been demonstrated here through the old internal symmetries which reigned in the 1960s. But what about contemporary theories? Perhaps all current physical theories that describe fundamental structures are converging into a general scheme where internal symmetries reside at the center of the structure. See, for instance, theories of particle physics and cosmology, such as quantum electrodynamics, quantum chromodynamics, electroweak unification, grand unified theories (GUTs) and quantum gravity. The symmetries behind GUTs can be interpreted as ontologically prior to baryons, i.e. to the fermions which comprise the bulk of matter (see below). Again, this is not a logical argument for weak ontic structuralism, but a possible metaphysical interpretation of present-day theories. 
It should be noted that gauge bosons, including photons, do not have an “inferior” ontological status with respect to their respective structures. For instance, in the case of QED and photons, both structure and its instantiations exist in all physically possible worlds. Indeed, photons are required to preserve the invariance of the free-electron QED Lagrangian under local phase transformations (gauge symmetry). Namely, the U(1) gauge symmetry requires the existence of photons. Hence in every physically possible world photons exist together with the structure. But photons cannot be treated as individuals, nor as instantiations of the structure. In a sense, they are part of the structure. 

7. Concluding remarks
Thus our arguments for weak ontic structuralism come from the practice of modern particle physics. In particular, the views of Murray Gell-Mann and Yuval Ne’eman, the founders of the Eightfold Way, may be interpreted in this way. In this connection, Tian Yu Cao mentions (2003, p. 7) the (above-mentioned) case of Gell-Mann who introduced quarks as mathematical objects for generating his algebra of currents as the basic “observable structure”. The existence of quarks was entailed by the SU(3) symmetry since they corresponded to the fundamental, 3-dimensional, representation of the group. Since baryons occupied the octet and decuplet representations, it was expected that also the fundamental triplet would be occupied by physical particles too. But all attempts to detect the missing particles had failed. Gell-Mann who called these particles “quarks”, treated them as mathematical entities from which current algebra was constructed. Quarks therefore played only “a heuristic role in allowing for the introduction of the structure”, to use French’s words. This reflected an anti-realist sentiment which was common to many theoretical physicists at the time. However, Cao interprets this view as ontic structuralism. Indeed, quarks could be treated as mathematical building blocks of the structure which consisted of the SU(3) symmetry and current algebra. This structure encompassed relations between operators that measure charges and currents. However, the latter could be accessible to the physicist only through the instantiations of the structure, i.e. through hadronic transitions. 
Cao claims that Gell-Mann’s approach, interpreted as ontic structuralism, apparently hindered the progress of particle physics, and he uses this questionable fact as an argument against ontic structuralism. Even if we accept Cao’s assertion that the progress of particle physics was halted by Gell-Mann, this is of course a fallacious kind of argument against ontic structuralism (“guilt by association”, to use F&L’s expression 2003, p. 42). Indeed, we can interpret also present theory, the Standard Model, as supporting ontic structuralism: the structure behind SM is a field-theoretical structure controlled by the symmetry of grand unification.
Thus, our filter model and the concept of ontological priority applies also to SM and GUTs. The Platonic world is occupied with an abstract structure which governs the behavior and composition of the physical world. At super-high energies all gauge bosons were practically massless, and all forces were unified, since all the carriers of forces – the gauge bosons – looked alike, i.e. like photons. At this energy scale, the symmetry was the symmetry of grand unification. As the physical universe cooled down after the Big Bang, the perfect symmetry was spontaneously broken, and the world has gradually reached its present physical conditions. 
For symmetry considerations, cosmologists tend to adopt the thesis that the early universe started at the Big Bang with baryon number zero or, in fact, without any baryons or anti-baryons at all. According to current estimates, the birth of baryons took place about 10-35 seconds after the Big Bang. Then the universe evolved into its present state with baryon excess. According to this picture, the birth of baryons, such as in the process 0e+p, came as a result of the mediation of X bosons. For instance, an anti-quark from the incoming pion and the incoming positron exchanged an X, resulting in two outgoing quarks which joined the remaining quark from the pion to form a proton. The violation of the particle-anti-particle symmetry, or the CP violation, was responsible for the different decay rates of the X’s and anti-X’s. So, as the initially symmetric universe cooled down, it evolved into an asymmetric universe with different numbers of X’s and anti-X’s. As a result, the quark population or the baryon population evolved into a particle-anti-particle asymmetry, i.e. into baryon excess.
Shortly after the birth of baryons, the expanding universe cooled down and the energies of the Xs decreased much below their mass (about 1015 times the proton’s). At these energies the Xs became extremely weak and the protons could not decay anymore. Thus, until a certain moment the world was baryon-free, whereas the symmetry of grand unification existed as an abstract structure. The world was populated by a ‘sea’ of fundamental fermions and gauge bosons in a quasi-virtual state. In other words, this sea played the role of the field-theoretical vacuum. The baryons were subsequently generated from the collisions of particles that were present. Quark-antiquark pairs could be produced from the vacuum by colliding γγ pairs and then 0s could be produced by quark-antiquark pairs. Protons could be created then through the reaction 0e+ p. The probability of the latter process is very low, but it is not zero. 
Thus, according to our definition, we can reach the following conclusion: the symmetry of grand unification is ontologically prior to baryon matter, which is the bulk of matter. This is almost the same conclusion that we reached for the old symmetries: the flavor SU(3) symmetry was ontologically prior to hadrons, i.e. to baryons and mesons, whereas the symmetry of GUTs is ontologically prior only to baryons. Returning to our filter model, the vacuum – which consists now of the sea of virtual fermions-pairs and gauge bosons – corresponds to the plasticine, and the photon pairs that supplies the energy to the processes of particle production from the vacuum, correspond to the driving piston. So, in general outline, SM and GUTs still reflects weak ontic structuralism.

An alternative ontology which may account for the symmetry of grand unification can be provided by superstring theory. In this case, ontology terminates in superstrings and we may return to the ontology of physical entities. But can we treat these multi-dimensional entities as individuals or objects? Since the scientific status of superstring theory is not clear yet, I would leave this question open. 
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^1	   Private communication with Yuval Ne’eman.
^2	  The term “phenomenological” is employed here in the sense used by the physicists.
^3	  Earman brings a citation from Steven Weinberg that can be interpreted in this manner (ibid).
^4	  After the failure in detecting the proton decay,  SU(5) has been discredited, but since there are many alternatives to it, none of which is considered to be perfect, I still use this group as an illustration.
^5	  “Unitary symmetry” and “unitaty spin” were employed as alternative names to the Eightfold Way.
^6	  By the term “rotations” I mean transformations of the group in internal space, e.g. one which carries every proton to a neutron and vice versa; it has nothing to do with rotations in ordinary space-time and with ordinary observers in relativity theory.
^7	  SU(2) has one Casimir operator so that each of it representations is characterized by one number, whereas SU(3) has two such operators so that each of its representations is characterized by two numbers.
^8	  I put Busch’s “weak” in quotation marks in order to distinguish it from our sense of the term.
